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Comment Edwin Lai
My comments incorporate not just my discussion during the conference
but also my reaction after reading the latest version of the chapter. This
chapter is about ﬁnancial development and current account balances. It
looks at the eﬀect of various aspects of ﬁnancial development on current
account (CA) balances and saving-investment determination. The chapter
is mainly motivated by Bernanke’s (2005) “global saving glut” hypothesis.
The hypothesis can be brieﬂy stated as follows:
1. The U.S. current account deﬁcit is mainly determined by the low cost
of borrowing made possible by the huge inﬂows of funds from emerging
markets, such as China and the rest of East Asia.
2. Investment demand in the United States has been very strong (or the
United States is an attractive destination for investment) in the last ten
years or so because of its political stability, strong property rights, good
regulatory environment, and strong performance in the equity market and
later the property market (following the dot-com bubble burst).
3. The CA deﬁcit has very little to do with the large budget deﬁcit of the
United States.
4. The U.S. current account deﬁcit is determined by factors beyond the
U.S. borders.
Bernanke thinks that the solution to this “unnatural” reversal of roles of
the less-developed countries (LDCs) being lenders and developed coun-
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vestment environments, macroeconomic stability, property rights, and ﬁ-
nancial liberalization.
Essentially, the main point of Bernanke’s (2005) speech was to explain
the ballooning current account deﬁcit of the United States in the years
leading to 2005. The alternative hypothesis he focused on was the “twin
deﬁcit” hypothesis—the large current account deﬁcit was a result of the
large budget deﬁcit.
The policy implications could not be more diﬀerent. If the saving glut
theory is correct, then the solution to the huge current account deﬁcit of
the United States is for emerging markets to liberalize ﬁnancial sectors so
that their citizens can invest their savings in domestic economies. This
would possibly result in higher interest rates (or higher returns to investors)
for savers and lower interest rates for borrowers (or lower cost of capital)
in these countries. If the twin deﬁcit hypothesis is correct, then the reduc-
tion of the humongous U.S. current account deﬁcit requires a reduction of
the budget deﬁcit.
To facilitate discussion, let us write down the following simple identity:
CA   S   I   (T   G),
where CA   current account balance; S   domestic private saving; I   do-
mestic private investment; T   tax revenue; G   government purchases.
Suppose the country under discussion is the United States. Obviously, if 
T– Gis relatively stable over time, then the ballooning CA deﬁcit cannot be
due to changes in budget deﬁcit. It must be due to a much faster increase in
Irelatively to that of S. On the contrary, if changes in T– Gmore or less mir-
rored changes in CA, then the twin deﬁcit hypothesis cannot be rejected.
My view of the saving glut hypothesis is that it comprises three parts.
First, twin deﬁcit hypothesis does not explain the huge current account
deﬁcit of the United States in recent years. Instead, the CA deﬁcit must be
explained by large increase in Irelative to that of Sin recent years. Second,
the large increase in I in the United States was made possible by large in-
ﬂux of funds from emerging markets, whose ﬁnancial development is rela-
tively weak. Third, ﬁnancial liberalization in these emerging markets can
reduce the outﬂows of funds from these countries and, therefore, diminish
this global saving glut. This will in turn help to reduce the CA deﬁcit of the
United States as cheap funds are not as easily available from overseas as be-
fore. Let us deal with each part one by one.
For the ﬁrst part of the hypothesis, if one examines the data on current
account balance of the United States in recent years (see table 4C.1) and
compare them with data on government budget balance of the United
States during the same period (see table 4C.2), one can see that the CA bal-
ance continued to deteriorate despite the gradual reduction in budget
deﬁcit. So the twin deﬁcit hypothesis is not supported by the data. So the
ﬁrst part of the hypothesis seems to be right.
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1. They are followed by Russia (US$95 billion) and Saudi Arabia (US$95 billion).
For the second part, if one examines data on current account balance of
countries all over the world in, say, 2005 and 2006, it is clear that while the
United States ran huge CA deﬁcits (US$811 billion in 2006), a number of
developed and less-developed countries ran CA surpluses. In 2006, for ex-
ample, the countries that ran the largest CA surpluses were China (US$250
billion), Japan (US$170 billion) and Germany (US$147 billion).1 There-
fore, one cannot say that the capital inﬂows into the United States were
mainly supported by capital outﬂows from emerging markets where the
levels of ﬁnancial development were low. So the second part of the hy-
pothesis can only be partially true.
For the third part, it is not immediately clear whether ﬁnancial liberal-
ization in the LDCs that ran CA surplus can reduce the CA deﬁcit deﬁcit
in the United States. In fact, this topic should be the main theme of the
present chapter. Note that to be consistent with the saving glut hypothesis,
the kind of ﬁnancial liberalization that one should consider in this context
should be the type that attracts domestic savers to invest in domestic mar-
kets. This would include reducing government regulation in the ﬁnancial
sector, improving legal infrastructure to enforce contracts and protect
property rights, and maintaining macroeconomic stability. Viewed from
this perspective, I can see several areas where this chapter can improve if it
truly wants to test whether the global saving glut hypothesis is true. First,
the chapter should focus on emerging markets. Second, one should focus
on variables that capture institutional quality that improves the domestic
investment environment, such as legal infrastructure, corporate gover-
nance, and independence of judiciary. The variables that the authors of this
chapter use are mainly not of this nature; instead, they use data that may
or may not reﬂect institutional quality or investment environment. For ex-
ample, activity in the stock market may not reﬂect high level of ﬁnancial
development if it is only a consequence of a lack of other high-quality
channels for domestic savers to invest (e.g., bonds and bank deposits), as
reﬂected in the recent stock craze in China. Third, not all types of ﬁnancial
reforms help domestic capital stay at home. On the contrary, some reforms
tend to increase capital outﬂows rather than stamping them, such as re-
forms that allow home citizens to invest abroad. Therefore, one should dis-
tinguish between the diﬀerent types of ﬁnancial liberalization and expect
them to yield diﬀerent eﬀects on the CA.
It is true that China, being an emerging market, is running higher than
its share of CA surplus as the United States is running higher than its share
of CA deﬁcit (especially if one looks at not only data up to 2006, but also
the estimated ﬁgures for 2007 and 2008 from the International Monetary
Fund [IMF]). Therefore, to test the saving glut hypothesis, one should per-
haps carry out an in-depth study of China. Would ﬁnancial liberalization
that reduces government regulation in the ﬁnancial sector, improve legalinfrastructure to enforce contracts and protect property rights, and main-
tain macroeconomic stability, reduce the CA surplus of China? Is it neces-
sary for China to allow its currency to ﬂoat more freely in order for its CA
surplus to decrease substantially? A time series analysis or case study may
be necessary to address this question.
Yet the present chapter does not seem to be directly testing the saving
glut hypothesis. Instead, being inspired by the hypothesis, it carries out a
cross-section analysis of the eﬀects of ﬁnancial development on current ac-
count balance. To bring the research closer to the saving glut hypothesis, I
suggest focusing more on the LDCs, as these are the countries where ﬁ-
nancial reforms are more pronounced. Moreover, if one really wants to
ﬁnd out whether ﬁnancial liberalization in general can reduce CA balance
in LDCs, one should perhaps test it directly. For example, one can identify
episodes of ﬁnancial liberalization in the LDCs and then run a cross-
section regression of lagged CA balance on dummies of episodes of ﬁnan-
cial liberalization while controlling for economic fundamentals that aﬀect
CA balance, such as exchange rate, business cycle, capital mobility, and so
on. This will be less controversial than using variables that may or may not
be able to capture ﬁnancial liberalization.
Finally, the empirical study should be guided by theory. The Mundell-
Fleming model immediately comes to mind, as it continues to be one of the
most compelling models in international ﬁnance. If one adopts the
Mundell-Fleming model, then how does ﬁnancial liberalization aﬀect cur-
rent account balance in that context? Financial liberalization may be in-
terpreted as an increase in the interest rate faced by lenders and a decrease
in the interest rate faced by borrowers. In the Mundell-Fleming model,
capital mobility and exchange rate regime aﬀect how current account bal-
ance reacts to changes in the interest rate faced by lenders and that faced
by borrowers. Therefore, both capital mobility (high, medium, low) and
exchange rate regime (ﬂoating, managed, ﬁxed) should be put on the right-
hand side of the equation. To illustrate why exchange rate regime should be
taken into account, note that if China continues to peg its currency to the
U.S. dollar (albeit allowing it to appreciate slowly), one surmises that its
current account balance would continue to be large even if it undertakes ﬁ-
nancial liberalization.
In summary, this chapter addresses a very topical and important policy
issue. Its ﬁndings should provide valuable inspiration for future research.
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